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displays four obvious characteristics ( Figure 1 shows the data1):
(1) As the party's share of the vote increases, its share of the seats also increases in a fairly regular fashion.
(2) The party that receives a majority of the votes usually receives a majority of parliamentary seats. Such was the case in 93 per cent of the national elections and 53 per cent of the state elections examined here. The points in the upper left and lower right quadrants represent those elections in which the party winning a majority of votes failed to take a majority of seats. New Jersey, like many other states prior to redistricting (and some after redistricting), shows many markedly biased outcomes, with the Democrats often winning fully three-fifths of the votes but less than one-third of the seats.
(3) A party that wins a majority of votes generally wins an even larger majority of seats. This was found in 89 per cent of the 64 national elections in which the party with a majority of votes also won parliamentary control. For the three U.S. states, the comparable figure was 83 per cent. In Rae's study of 117 elections in 20 countries (including multi-party systems), it was 91 per cent of the elections.2 (4) In most elections (100 per cent in this series), the winning party receives less than 65 per cent of the votes (although it may receive a much larger share of seats).
Even a casual inspection of the data displayed in Figure 1 indicates that almost any curve with a slope around two or three in the region from 35 to 65 per cent of the vote for a party will fit the relationships rather well. Let us now turn to three models that seek to describe the relationships methods revealed small differences in most estimates when the bias was less than 5 per cent and the correlation between seats and votes was fairly high (usually the case); otherwise the estimates diverged. Confidence intervals for the estimated bias, if one believes they are appropriate for these data, can be constructed for the first three methods. For the complex case of method 1, see Albert H. Bowker and Gerald J. Lieberman, Engineering -Statistics (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1959), p. 253; for methods 2 and 3, the usual confidence intervals in regression apply. Still another interesting bias is suggested by the question: What proportion of the seats does a party receive when it wins 50% of the vote? For the fitted line, this bias is, by the geometry of the situation, the product of the slope and the bias described in Figure 2 .
The clear advantage of the linear fit is that it yields two politically meaningful numbers, the swing ratio and the bias, that can be compared over time and electoral systems. Table 1 records the fitted lines for a variety of elections. The swing ratios and the biases show considerable variation both between electoral systems and within some systems over time. Among the countries, Great Britain has the greatest -swing ratio at 2.8. In the United States, the swing ratio has been about two, although, as we shall see later, there is evidence that in the last few elections, the swing ratio has decreased considerably. The U.K. electoral system shows little bias; in the U.S., a persistent bias has favored the Democratic party-partially the result of that party's victories in small congressional districts and in districts with low turnouts. In Michigan, New Jersey, and New York, there have been large biases favoring the Republicans and a great deal of variation in swing ratios. The relationship between votes and seats is weaker for the three states than for the three countries; in fact, in the states during some time periods there was virtually no correlation between the share of seats that a party won in the legislature and the share of votes it had received at the polls! In more recent elections, however, there was a fairly strong relationship between seats and votes in all three states-probably the result of new rules and practices for districting. The fitted straight line estimates two measures of the performance of the electoral system-the responsiveness and the bias-from the outcomes of several previous elections. Confusion between the effects of swing ratio and bias sometimes occurs when only one election is considered at a time; thus one noted student of apportionment writes:
In New Jersey in 1966 the Democrats gained a 9-6 edge in congressional seats, despite a Republican plurality in the popular vote. By contrast, for the state legislature in New Jersey, using a mixture of new single-and multi-member districts, a comfortable, but not overwhelming Republican plurality in popular votes in 1967 produced a sweep of two-thirds of the seats in each house. Many other examples could be given of these gross imbalances between popular votes received by a party and the number of legislators elected from that party, both before and after one man, one vote, revisions.5
Although there is a "gross imbalance" between votes and seats in these two cases, they differ both with respect to the causes of the imbalance and the appropriate normative evaluation of it. In the case of New Jersey congressional elections from 1964 to 1970, there was a bias of 7 per cent; the swing ratio was 1.6. In elections to the New Jersey Assembly from 1965 to 1969, there was a bias of less than one per cent but a swing ratio of 3.6. Thus, the imbalance between seats and votes in congressional elections was due to bias in the districting arrangements; in elections for the Assembly, in contrast, it was due to a steep swing ratio (a consequence of multimember districts) in what has recently become a relatively unbiased system. The two situations, then, differ: electoral systems biased toward a particular party are hardly defensible, at least in relatively democratic systems; very different swing ratios can be justified, however, depending on the objectives sought in constructing an electoral system. Before examining the consequences and causes of differences in swing ratios and biases in detail, let us consider some alternatives to the straight line-the famous "cube law," and a logit model. Since Kendall and Stuart wrote, quite a number of papers have touched upon the law and, in the last few years, the law has enjoyed a certain vogue and has been fitted to electoral outcomes in England, the United States, New Zealand, and, in a modified form, in Canada.7 With one or two exceptions, discussions of the law are quite sympathetic, suggesting that it is a useful and accurate description of electoral realities. Most studies consider no more than a few data points and conclude that the law fits rather well-although the quality of fit is usually assessed informally and no alternative fits are tried. Let us consider a direct test of the predictions of the cube law. The law is Table 2 reports the results of tests of these predictions. The table indicates that the cube law fits poorly in six of the seven trials. It fits quite well for the last eight elections in Great Britain, but otherwise its predictions are not confirmed. In short, it is not a "law." Since previous studies have not tested the exact joint predictions of the cube law (that is, Bo =0 and i,3= 3) or used as extensive a collection of data, these results should be decisive in evaluating the empirical merits of the cube law. Even in the case of Great Britain, the linear model (and the rule of thumb replacing the cube law proposed below) fits just as well as the cube law, is simpler in form, and is politically more informative.
Disposing of the Cube Law
"But," a defender of the cube law might reply at this point, "aren't there some sound theoretical underpinnings of the cube law-and even though it may not fit very well statistically, doesn't the law retain some merits at least as approximate quantitative theory 
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The American Political Science Review Vol. 67 Note: The simultaneous joint hypothesis of the cube law was tested with the appropriate F-ratio; even the most relaxed standards (p= .50) did not lead to acceptance of the predictions of the cube law (with the exception of Great Britain). The statistical significance of the bias was tested by computing the t-value on the hypothesis that the intercept of the fitted line does not equal zero. A significant bias (at the .05 level or better) was found in all cases except Great Britain. It is perhaps surprising that the results of the tests are so crisp, given the relatively small number of cases. However, since the data points are rather tightly clustered about the fitted curves, the error variance is small and the results show a perhaps unexpected stability.
lead to specific derivations of the swing ratio predicted by the cube law.'0
The real theoretical defect of the cube law, however, is that it hides important political issues. The law implies that the translation of votes into seats is (1) unvarying over place and time, and (2) always "fair," in the sense that the curve traced out by the law passes through the point (50 per cent votes, 50 per cent seats), and the bias is zero. As we have seen, these implications are not true. The rate of translation of votes into seats differs greatly across political systems, ranging between gains of 1.3 to 3.7 per cent in seats for each 1.0 per cent gain in votes. Also the results in Table 1 indicate that some electoral systems persistently favor a particular party; the votes-seats curve traced out by the data does not inevitably pass close by the point (50 per cent votes, 50 per cent seats).
It might finally be argued that the cube law still has some faint merit because it is a simple, universal summary of how votes are translated into seats. It is not particularly convenient: how many students of politics can recall that the "cube of vote odds predicts the seat odds" and quickly perform the considerable mental arithmetic required to extract the number of seats predicted by the law? The following rule is a more convenient and more accurate summary of the data than the cube law: Table 2 , there is a statistically significant bias in all cases except Great Britain. The logit model is statistically more satisfactory than the linear fit; but its coefficients are not as readily interpretable from a political point of view as are those of the linear model. Thus the straightline fit was chosen as best suited for our purposes.
Some Explanations and Consequences
of Differences in Swing Ratios Why does the swing ratio vary over time and across electoral systems? Such differences depend, of course, on how voters are distributed over electoral districts. If voters are randomly distributed over all districts-that is, if every district is effectively like every other district-then the swing ratio would be very large, since a party that won even slightly more than half the vote would win all the seats. In effect, the whole nation would be a single member district. Now consider the other extreme in the way districts might be constructed: every voter represents herself or himself in parliament in a two-party system. Such an arrangement yields an exact equivalence of votes and seats along with a swing ratio of unity. This example suggests that the more nationally oriented the politics of a county or the more nationalized the forces prevailing in a given election, the greater the swing ratio-other things being equal.
Another line of argument suggests the same conclusion. Suppose a party gains an average of X per cent of the vote from one election to the next. Consider two different ways in which that gain could be distributed over electoral districts:
(1) The party could gain exactly X per cent of the vote in all districts; that is, a uniform swing of X per cent in all districts.
(2) The party could gain X per cent averaged over all districts, but, in some districts, the gain would be less than X per cent and, in other districts, the gain would exceed X per cent-yielding an averaged swing of X per cent over all the districts.
Under which distribution of swings, the uniform or the averaged, will the party gain the most seats? In general, a uniform swing across all districts yields more seats than the averaged swing. (Of course, if the same amount of swing were properly distributed over the marginal districts, then a party could maximize the number of seats-won for a given amount of swing.) For example, compare the results of a uniform swing of 1 per cent in all districts with those of an averaged swing of 1 per cent that reflects a swing of 2 per cent in half the districts and of 0 per cent in the other half. Define D49 as the number of districts in which the division of the vote was between 49 and 50 per cent in the previous election (and thus these districts will change hands with a 1 per cent swing favoring the initially minority party). Define D48 similarly. The argument now hinges on the assumption that D49 is greater than D48 (or more generally that the distribution of districts tails off as the division of vote moves away from 50 per cent). With this assumption, which is generally reasonable, a uniform swing of 1 per cent shifts a total of D49 seats; the averaged swing of 1 per cent (half at 2 per cent, half at 0 per cent) shifts a total of 1/2 D49 + 1/2 D48 seats, which is less than the gain resulting from the uniform shift, D49.
Once again the argument suggests that the more uniform electoral swings are across the nation, the greater will be the swing ratio. Thus, we would expect the swing ratio in Britain to be greater than that in the United States. We would also expect that, in U.S. congressional elections, the swing ratio will be greater in on-year elections with the presidential contest on the ballot than in off-year elections (when national forces are somewhat diminished). These expectations are borne out in both cases.
Stokes, in his comparison of voting for representatives in the U.K. and U.S., has clearly shown that electoral forces are far more nationalized in parliamentary elections than they are in congressional elections.'2 The standard deviation of electoral swings from the national average has been approximately 1.8 in Britain in recent years; the comparable figure for the United States is 5.4. Thus, it is reasonable to find the swing ratio (2.83) to be greater for Britain than for the United States (1.93), as was shown earlier in Table 1. A comparison between on-year and off-year congressional elections in the United States reveals a similar, although somewhat more fragile, result: the swing ratio is usually greater for blocs of on-year elections than for blocs of off-year elections, reflecting the presumably greater nationalization of congressional elections when they are held simultaneously with presidential elections. It is also clear from Table 3 
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The American Political Science Review Vol. 67 tiveness of districts; the presence of many closely contested districts will lead to higher swing ratios, since small shifts in the vote will change the party control in many districts. Thus, the swing ratio is the product of both the distribution of swings and the distribution of the district party share of the votes upon which the swings are operating. Some control over the distribution of the party share of the vote is provided in the test in Table 3 by breaking the elections up into 20-year blocs. The relationship between the swing ratio and turnover in seats will be examined in greater detail shortly.
The larger swing ratio in on-year elections generally benefits the President's party, since the steeper slope in the votes-seats translation associated with on-year elections turns small gains in votes into relatively large gains in seats. In the next off-year election, however, even if the vote returns to normal, the President's party will typically lose fewer seats than it gained because it is ndw riding down the less steep seats-votes curve associated with off-year elections.
This observation can be stated in more formal terms. Suppose the President's party increases its share of votes in the on-year election by AJV, thereby gaining #,(A V) seats (where is the swing ratio in on-year elections). Let 12 be the swing ratio in off-year elections. It is observed empirically that #1>#2.
In the next off-year election, in order for the out-party to regain those seats lost to the President's party in the previous on-year election, the out-party needs to increase its share of votes up to AV + E, yielding 132(A V + E) seats, where E is the excess share of votes needed to overcome the reduced swing ratio in off-year elections. Regaining all the lost seats requires that In order to regain its seats lost in the previous onyear election, the out-party needs a shift almost one-fourth greater than the shift in votes which originally won those seats for the President's party. For example, if in an on-year election the President's party gained four percentage points in votes over its previous winnings (and consequently about 8.4 per cent in seats, given the swing ratio), then the out-party would need a vote shift of 1.24 X 4% = 5% to regain the lost seats.
Sources of Bias
The party biases computed earlier result from gerrymandering, differential turnout across districts, and the different population sizes of electoral districts. The purpose of gerrymandering is to shift the seats-votes curve and thereby produce a party advantage. A party advantage may also arise when the votes of districts with widely different turnouts or sizes are aggregated, as in the case of many formerly malapportioned state legislatures. Consider, for instance, the total votes and total seats as they are aggregated over districts. For the House of Representatives, each district adds 1/435 to the seats total; but some districts may add a much smaller share to the total votes for each party. If, in the aggregate of all districts, low turnout or small districts are aligned with a particular party, there will be a bias in the seats-votes curve since that party is winning seats with relatively small numbers of votes.
The persistent Democratic advantage in congressional races is partially the consequence of the many low turnout districts in the South which have usually added much to the Democratic seat total, but little to the Democratic vote total. An additional source of Democratic advantage, prior to the equalization of population size of congressional districts, was the tendency for Democrats to come from smaller districts than Republicans, both in and outside the South. For the 1962 congressional elections, Table 4 indicates that Republican candidates tended to win in the larger districts; thus Republican seats were more expensive in terms of votes than Democratic seats.
The relationship between the district population size and party vote has, surprisingly, persisted even after the extensive redistricting of recent years. Although the Republicans now waste somewhat fewer votes in large districts (because of the reduction of variation in district size), there
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remains, as per cent (a range in votes that is the fifth smallest of the 17 triplets). Until the Republicans control Congress or the Democrats win more decisively, the "new" swing ratio and bias will not be well estimated. The bias is a spectacular 7.9 per cent, reflecting the two close votes that yielded the Democrats a substantial party majority in the House. The estimate of the bias for the 1966-1970 election triplet is, however, somewhat more insecure than for previous blocs of elections because the error of the estimated bias is proportional to the reciprocal of the swing ratio-and in this case the swing ratio is moderately small.
An alternative method of determining the seatsvotes curve, used by David Butler in studies of recent British elections, provides confirmation of the relatively large bias and small swing ratio. Compared with all the other performances of the electoral systems examined in this paper, a system with a swing ratio of 0.7 and a bias of 7.9 per cent, describes a set of electoral arrangements that is both quite unresponsive to shifts in the preferences of voters ( in neither year were they able to win even 45 per cent of the House seats. The swing ratio indicates the potential for turnover in representation. The smaller the swing ratio, the less responsive the party distribution of seats is to shifts in the preferences of voters. The extreme case is a swing ratio near zero; such a flat seats-votes curve means that the disti ibution of seats does not change with the distribution of votes. Figure 5 shows the strong relationship between the swing ratio and the turnover in the House of Representatives for election triplets since 1870. Note the steady drift downward over the years in both the swing i atio and the turnover. Since 1948, the swing ratio has shifted from 2.8 to 2.4 to 1.7, and, most recently, to 0.7. Similarly the turnover in the House has declined, reflecting the long-run decrease in the intensity of competition for congressional seats. Table 7 
